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BRADY DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA

trine is similarly oriented; its foundation in due process calls for permissive
application.
Ultimately, liberal Brady disclosure in Florida will accomplish several goals
of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor can fulfill his duty to the administration of justice and the advancement of the truth-finding process by
disclosing information in his possession. Provided with such information, the
accused can prepare a more complete and accurate defense. Finally, use of
Brady disclosure tools in conjunction with Florida's discovery rules can reduce
the investigatory inequity between state and defendant to a minimum in the
interests of fundamental fairness.249
ROBERT

S. GRiscri

BURDENS OF PERSUASION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AFTER
PATTERSON v. NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION

At odds in every criminal proceeding are two vital but seemingly irreconcilable interests. First, the defendant faces the stigma and loss of liberty accompanying an adjudication of guilt., Recognizing these risks, the courts have
interpreted the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to mandate
that states accord a criminal defendant certain fundamental rights such as trial
by jury, access to bail, and assistance of counsel.2 In competition with these due
process rights is each state's power to define and control criminal behavior.
Federal courts have traditionally respected both the freedom of state legislatures to specify which acts merit criminal sanctions and the power of state
courts to interpret these laws. 3 Because the due process rights of the criminal
defendant necessarily limit this state authority, however, a tension develops
when federal courts measure a state penal statute against due process standards.
One area where due process limits state power to define and control crime
is the allocation of the burdens of proof. To assure the defendant the fairness
249. See note 1 supra.
1. "The combination of stigma and loss of liberty involved in a conditional or absolute
sentence of imprisonment sets that sanction apart from anything else the law imposes." Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. REV. 107, 151.
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by jury made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (the fundamental right to a fair trial includes effective assistance of counsel); United
States ex rel. Siegel v. Follette, 290 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (weight of authority and
reason favors application of bail clause of eighth amendment to the states).
3. "It is of course within the power of the State to regulate procedure under which its
laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, 'unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523 (1958) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See, e.g., Sandalow, Henry

v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Cr.
Rxv. 187, 188-90.
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prescribed by the due process clause, 4 the law clothes him with a presumption
of innocence. 5 This presumption reduces the risk of erroneous conviction by
requiring that uncertainty on the issue of guilt be resolved in favor of the
defendantA Based on a preference for freeing the guilty rather than sacrificing
the liberty and reputation of innocent defendants, 7 the presumption of innocence has been implemented by the requirement that the prosecution prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the reasonable doubt
standard as a constitutional mandate in the 1970 decision of In re Winship.9
Since then, however, the Court has applied the decision in a seemingly inconsistent manner. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,o the Court indicated that the reasonable doubt standard required more than proof of the basic elements of an
offense as defined by state statute.1 Courts and commentators thus concluded
that a federal court could specify the facts that the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to meet due process standards, regardless of whether
4. Because error may result in significant loss to the defendant, fairness is of paramount
concern in criminal proceedings. McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §341 (2d
ed. 1972); Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28
BAYLOR L. REv. 120, 122-23 (1976). See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934) (the
limits of reason and fairness control the allocation of burdens of proof in criminal actions).
5. "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). Although generally denominated a presumption, the presumption of innocence merely expresses
the view that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McCORMICK, supra
note 4, §346. Several authors have expressed a preference for the use of the term assumption
in describing the concept of innocent until proven guilty. These authors have generally noted
that since there need not be proved a basic fact from which the presumed fact of innocence
follows, the view that the law "assumes" innocence more accurately describes this aspect of
criminal procedure. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process
in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 173 (1969).
6. Holland & Chamberlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt?, 7 VAL. L. Rav. 147, 148 (1973). The rule also emphasizes that guilt should not be
assumed simply because the defendant has been brought to trial based on the suspicion of
police and prosecutors. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burdenof-Persuasion Practicesin Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 881 n.6 (1968).
7. Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29
ARK. L. REV. 429, 432 (1976). See also May, Some Rules of Evidence: ReasonableDoubt in Civil
and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REv. 642, 651-55 (1876), where the author suggests that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence were innovations designed to
decrease the risk of erroneous conviction during a period when all felonies were punished by
death. But cf. Morano, A Reevaluation of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule,
55 B.U.L. REV. 507, 509-13 (1975) for an argument that historically the burden had been
proof beyond any doubt, and that requiring only a reasonable doubt thus diminished protection afforded defendants.
8. Osenbaugh, supra note 7, at 433. See generally Morano, supra note 7.
9. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Several legal commentators have noted that because courts at all
levels throughout the country had subscribed to the reasonable doubt standard long before
the Winship decision, the Supreme Court had never had the occasion to constitutionalize that
standard. See LAFAVE & Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §8 (1972); McCORMICK, supra
note 4, §341; 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2497 (3d ed. 1940).
10. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
11. Id. at 697-98.
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those facts were included as elements in the statutory definition of the offense.'
3
A few years later, however, the Court in Patterson v. New York' reappraised
the role of the reasonable doubt rule and, without expressly overruling Mullaney, opined that the state's burden of proof extended no further than those
definitional elements. 4 This note examines these Supreme Court decisions,
attempts to reconcile the conflicting holdings, and determines thereby the extent to which a federal court may oversee the drafting and application of state
criminal statutes.

HISTORiCAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEwoRK

References to the reasonable doubt standard appeared in the common law
as early as the fourth century.' 5 Although the standard was variously defined
throughout history, 6 most courts have ruled that the reasonable doubt rule
demands that the trier of fact be as fully convinced of his conclusion as possi-

ble,'7 short of an absolute certainty.18 Thus, even when the evidence weighs in
12.
13.
14.
15.

See notes 77-99 infra and accompanying text.
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 205-10.
One author traced the reasonable doubt standard to passages in the fourth century

works of CorPus Julus and CoRE'S 3D INSTITUTE. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVmENcE AT COMMON LAW (1898). See also 9 WirMORE, supra note 9, §2497; The Supreme
Court,1969 Term, 84 Hiutv. L. REv. 1, 156-65 (1970). Several other commentators have pointed
to the 1798 Dublin Txeason Cases as the origin of the modem day rule, relying upon a com-

ment there that "if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt upon the truth of the testimony of
witness given upon the issue they are sworn well and truly to try, they are bound" to acquit.
May, supra note 7, at 656; McCORmicx, supra note 4, §341. However, even earlier origins, the

1770 Boston Massacre Trials, have been suggested as the American rule's genesis. See Morano,
supra note 7, at 508.
16. In Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455 (1895), the Court recounted an anecdote
explaining the rule's value: "Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian
which illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law. Numerius ...was on
trial before the Emperor ....Numerius contented himself with denying his guilt, and there
was not sufficient proof against him. His adversary.... seeing that the failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself and exclaimed 'Oh, illustrious Caesarl If it is
sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?' to which Julian replied, 'If it
suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?'"
One frequently cited definition of the reasonable doubt standard appeared in a jury instruction in Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850): "Reasonable
doubt.., is a term often used, and probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined.
It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs and depending
upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case,
which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they felt an abiding conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge." Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the
Burden of Proof to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REv. 499 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881) (jury charged that proof

beyond a reasonable doubt is such that will produce an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the claimed fact exists); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) (to
fairly inflict punishment, a procedure must require proof of all elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Wilson v. United
States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holland &Chamberlin, supra note 6, at 150.
18. See The Supreme Court,1969 Term, supra note 15, at 156-65.
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favor of conviction, the trier of fact must acquit unless that evidence is overwhelming. 19
The burden of proof concept has two distinct components. The first, the
burden of producing evidence, requires that the party allocated the burden
offer evidence which if believed would be sufficient to support a jury finding of
the existence or non-existence of a particular fact. 20 The second component, the
burden of persuasion, controls the ultimate decision and mandates that the trier
of fact be convinced of the truth of the issuable fact.21 In a state criminal proceeding, the prosecution normally has the burden of persuading the factfinder
beyond a reasonable doubt. The state's evidence must be not only clear, but
also so convincing as to remove nearly all uncertainty of guilt.
Clearly, the reasonable doubt standard controls the ultimate determination
of guilt or innocence. In designating the issues as to which the prosecution must
persuade the trier of fact, however, a conflict arises between the state's interest
in retaining independent control over its criminal justice system and the federal interest in protecting the defendant's due process rights. In effect, a federal
court ruling that due process requires the state shoulder the burden of
persuasion for a particular fact usurps the state's power to define crime. The
extent to which federal intervention denigrates this power depends upon
whether due process permits a federal court merely to determine how the
persuasion burden must be allocated once a state defines a crime, or whether
due process standards may be applied to permit federal court specification of
minimum elements for which the state must bear the burden of persuasion.
Historically, the prosecution's persuasion burden has extended to each ele-

19. Whether the reasonable doubt standard actually serves its intended purpose remains
uncertain absent empirical data substantiating its effectiveness. It has been suggested, however,
that the standard has some effect upon the decision-making process. Underwood, The Thumb
on the Scale of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1308-10
n.34 (1977). Compare McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 242
(1944) (the risk of nonpersuasion serves an important role in the decision-making process)
with Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1164-67
(1972) (decision-making rarely aided by an instruction on the persuasion burden). See generally
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968). For a
discussion of juries' understanding of instructions see Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A

Threat to Justice, 59

JUDICATuRE

478 (1976).

20. Numerous commentators have lamented the use of the term "burden of proof" rather
than the specific designations of "burden of persuasion" and "burden of going forward with
evidence." See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 19, at 1301 n.3. The latter burden requires the
production of evidence sufficient to satisfy a judge that the issue is properly raised. See McCORMICK, supra note 4, §336. The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, "means the
burden which is discharged when the tribunal which is to determine the existence or nonexistence of the fact is persuaded by sufficient evidence to find the fact exists." MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE,

1301.
21.

Rule 1(3) (1942);

McCOMICK,

supra note 4, §336; Underwood, supra note 19, at

See generally McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a

Burden of Persuasion, 68

HARV.

L. REV. 1382 (1955); 1

HUGHES, FLORIDA EVIDENCE MANUAL

(1975).
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ment of the statutory definition of the offense. 22 Defendants have frequently
been required to bear the burden of persuasion on issues which did not comprise an element of the prosecution's case. These non-elements, denominated
affirmative defenses, admit commission of the statutorily prescribed acts, but
23
offer some justification or excuse.
The determination of which party bears the burden of persuasion for a
particular issue should be based on the issue's relationship to the statutory
definition of the crime. The burden should not be imposed on the defendant
when the fact at issue is a definitional element of the crime or constitutes the
negative of an element such that the defendant would be forced to prove the
element's absence. The defense of alibi, for example, denies a basic and essential element of a crime, presence at the time and place the crime occurred.
A valid alibi establishes absence and negates the essential element of presence.
To require that the defendant prove the negative of a statutory element would
relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, requiring the state to prove the non-existence of a defense such as
alibi seems proper, once the defendant has raised the issue by satisfying the
burden of producing evidence.
In contrast, consider an affirmative defense24 such as entrapment, which admits commission of the criminal act but alleges as an excuse or by way of
mitigation the improper conduct of state officers. Requiring the defendant to
persuade the factfinder of this affirmative defense's validity will never relieve
the prosecution of proving any portion of its case, because the state must have
satisfied the burden of proving guilt before consideration of this mitigating fact.
Thus, imposing the burden of persuasion on a defendant pleading an affirmative defense meets due process standards.
Analyzing each fact in relation to the statutory definition thus facilitates a
proper allocation of the persuasion burden. A simple defense denies the ex-

22. See cases cited note 33 infra.
23. Courts justify burdening defendants with these so-called affirmative defenses by
suggesting that they do not affect the determination of guilt, but rather provide justification
or excuse. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795-96 (1952) (insanity defense). See Note,
Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionalityof Placing a Burden of Persuasion
on a CriminalDefendant, 64 GFo. L. J. 871, 879-80 (1976).
The Model Penal Code defines affirmative defenses as follows: "A ground of defense is
affirmative . . . when it involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence."
MoDEL PENAL CODE §1.21(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Statutory and judicial use of the
term has been inconsistent, however, and therefore mere designation of a particular fact as

an affirmative defense should not be considered dispositive as to who bears the burden of
persuasion. Underwood, supra note 19, at 1303 n.11.
24. Several commentators have employed the term "true affirmative defense" to specify a
*defense which offers an excuse or justification and stands independent of the elements of the
offense. See Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another
View, 1970 DUKE LJ. 919, 934 (1970); Note, supra note 4, at 121. This term suggests that the
nature of the fact in relation to the offense should determine its designation as an element, a

defense or an affirmative defense, and therefore the nature of the fact limits the state's power
to draft a statute. Underwood, supra note 19, at 1303 n,l1,
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istence of a definitional element and thus raises an issue which if resolved in the
defendant's favor would result in a verdict of not guilty. A true affirmative defense, on the other hand, relates to justification or excuse and admits commission of the criminal act, but neither establishes nor negates an element of the
offense. Proper identification of these two types of defenses controls assignment
of the burden of persuasion as mandated by the due process requirement that
guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONSTrTU

ONALIZING

THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

-

In re Winship
In In re Winship2s the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
proof beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes one of the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" 26 required during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile
proceeding when the juvenile had been charged with an act which if committed by an adult would be a criminal offense. In answering affirmatively, 27
the Court employed a historical analysis which indicated the long existence of
the reasonable doubt standard in the American criminal justice system. 28 Also
influential in the Winship Court's decision was the near unanimity of all common law jurisdictions in requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
actions.29
As explained in Winship, the reasonable doubt standard reduced the risk of
erroneous criminal conviction, thereby implementing the presumption of innocence. The Court deemed such risk avoidence essential, primarily because of
the important interests at stake.30 These interests, defined in Winship as liberty
and reputation,3' prompted the Court to specify that the "Due Process Clause
25. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
26. Id. at 359 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)). The Gault decision concerned
whether at a juvenile commitment proceeding the juvenile must be accorded the same rights
due a criminal defendant. Although the Court found that the juvenile hearing need not mirror
a criminal trial, it opined that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required
application of "the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Winship considered whether
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was such an essential.
27. The Court's holding was a very narrow one: "'where a 12-year-old child is charged
with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as long as six years, then,
as a matter of due process . . . the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" 397 U.S. at 368, citing 24 N.Y.2d at 207, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 423, 247 N.E.2d at 260.
28. 379 U.S. at 361-63. See the discussion of the historical basis of the reasonable doubt
standard, supra notes 15 & 16.
29. 397 U.S. at 361-62. In the Court's words: "Although virtually unanimous adherence
to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish
it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the
way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.'" Id., citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
30. 397 U.S. at 363. The Court implicitly recognized the constitutional basis of the
reasonable doubt standard in commenting that the fundamental fairness required by the
Constitution was implicated by the degree of proof required. Thus, it may be inferred that
the reasonable doubt standard is equivalent to the traditional essentials of due process such
as the right to jury trial, assistance of counsel and bail.
31. "The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense ina-
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protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
3
charged." 2
The Winship Court's recognition of the constitutional basis of the reasonable doubt standard seemed a small step in light of the implicit acknowledgment in earlier Supreme Court decisions3s that such a foundation existed. 4
portance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." 397 U.S. at 863. The
Court later reiterated the importance of the liberty interest, referring to that interest as one
of "transcending value," and presumably indicating that it constitutes the paramount interest
to be protected by the reasonable doubt rule. 397 U.S. at 364. The term "stigma" apparently
signifies the defendant's interest in reputation. See Note, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HAav. C.R. -C.L. Rv.

390, 396 (1976).
The desirability of maintaining the confidence of the community in the criminal justice
system also influenced the Court. Protecting this interest would assure the public that criminal
sanctions could not be imposed except where guilt was certain. It has been suggested that
although Winship has been most often cited as protective of three interests - liberty, reputation and community confidence -this third interest merely restates the effect resulting from
proper protection of the other two interests. See Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A
Comment on Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 Micii.
L. REv.30 (1977).
32. 397 U.S. at 364. One observation may prove helpful in analyzing later Supreme Court
opinions interpreting Winship. The Court specified that because the criminal defendant risked
these vital interests, the reasonable doubt standard should apply to every fact necessary to
constitute the crime. Subsequent opinions indicate, although incorrectly, that only those facts
which affect the defendant's three due process interests should be governed by that standard.
Thus, the Winship rationale was altered in these cases from one which specifies in which
actions the reasonable doubt standard should apply to one which specifies which facts within
a proceeding should be controlled by the standard.
33. On numerous occasions the Court had intimated that the reasonable doubt standard
has constitutional origins. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (burden
of proof defined as duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element necessary to constitute the crime); Holland v. United States, 848 U.S. 121, 138 (1954) (an essential part of any
procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such punishment is that all elements of the
crime charged be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). See generally, Holland & Chamberlin,
supra note 6, at 150.
34. In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895), the Court had come closest to
recognizing that due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal actions.
There, the Court opined that the defendant in a federal criminal case must be proved sane
beyond a reasonable doubt. Most courts, however, interpreted Davis as applicable to only
federal cases. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952) (Davis "establish[ed] no
constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal courts").
After Winship enshrined the reasonable doubt standard among those rights applied to
state defendants through the fourteenth amendment, Leland's holding appeared to have been
overturned. Several courts questioned Leland's force in the aftermath of Winship. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa.
380, 386, 321 A.2d 880, 882 (1974); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 15, 268 A.2d 89, 90 (1970).
The Leland decision was not expressly rejected, however, and courts generally continued to rely
upon that case as authority for refusing to invalidate affirmative defenses after Winship. See,
e.g., United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1977 (1974); Philips v. Hocker, 473 F.2d 395, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939
(1974); State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 255, 194 N.W. 2d 276, 281 (1972). See generally Note,
supra note 23.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

Despite the apparent ease of the Court's transition from implicit to explicit
recognition, however, the failure to clarify the manner in which to implement
the reasonable doubt standard left several questions unanswered s5 Most disconcerting was the lack of guidance as to which facts within a statutory scheme
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.36 This failure rendered
the decision susceptible of two contrasting interpretations regarding the proper
manner of determining the facts that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.
First, the Court may have intended to prescribe federal adherence to the
traditional policy of allowing each state to control interpretation of state law37
Under this view of Winship, a federal court would ascertain whether a fact
constituted an element of the offense as defined by the state in order to resolve
whether the burden of persuasion may be shifted to the defendant.38 Because
Winship applied the reasonable doubt standard to only those elements necessary to establish guilt, if confined to its facts the decision appears to ordain
such an elements test.3 9 Further, because the Court did not determine how the
burden of persuasion should be allocated, state power to designate the facts
necessary to prove a crime appears intact.4o Thus, if interpreted to prescribe
35. The definition of criminal behavior became extremely important following Winship's
holding that a state must prove each fact essential to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, however, the decision failed to specify the proper manner in which to define such
behavior. Also unanswered was whether the power to define was exclusively the state's or
whether the Constitution demanded certain components be present in any definition of
criminality. See Angel, Substantive Due Process and the CriminalLaw, 9 Loy. COH.L.J. 61, 93
(1977).
36. The absence of guidance as to how such facts should be determined compounded the
dissatisfaction with the opinion. See Note, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New
York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 171, 186 (1976); Comment,
Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 1128, 1134 (1954); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513,523 (1958).
38. Although the Court explicitly ruled that all "facts" be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, subsequent courts interpreted this to mean all elements of the offense; thus only those
facts within the definition of the offense were considered necessary. See Morano, supra note 7.
39. Winship raised the issue of whether a juvenile could be convicted on proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, in commenting "[1]est there remain any doubt about
the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard," the Court indicated an intention
to establish as a constitutional doctrine the already existing practice of requiring proof of
elements of an offense by that standard. The mere reference to cases so applying the reasonable
doubt standard, without explicating the manner in which to implement the standard, further
supports the conclusion that the Winship Court contemplated adherence to the mandate of
those cases. 397 U.S. at 364. See Allen, supra note 31, at 31.
Arguably, because it concerned only whether the determination of guilt or innocence must
be by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Winship should not be extended to collateral matters
such as the determination of sentence. At the point the penalty to be imposed is decided,
guilt or innocence has been established and therefore, as prior Supreme Court decisions indicate, the due process clause does not restrict discretion in sentencing. See Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971). See also Brief for
Petitioner at 10, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
40. Accordingly, the state courts and legislatures would continue, unimpeded by the
Winship decision, to designate the facts necessary to constitute a particular crime. See Note,
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an elements analysis, the Winship decision requires a federal court to review a
conviction solely to insure that the prosecution bore the burden of persuasion
for each element that the state deems essential.41 An elements analysis therefore
leaves unrestrained the state's power to reduce the prosecution's burden by
narrowly redefining a crime and thereby minimizing the elements of the state's
42
case.
An equally plausible explanation of the Winship Court's treatment of the
reasonable doubt standard is that the Court intended that state control yield
in certain situations to the federal interest in protecting a defendant's due process rights.4 3 Rather than employing the term "element," the Court specified that
"facts" necessary to constitute the crime must be proven, thereby indicating that
the statutory definition might not limit the issues upon which the prosecution
bears the persuasion burden.44 This view implies that the state may be constitutionally obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an identifiable minimum of elements for each offense.45 Determination of the constitutional
minimum would be a federal question and would justify federal court review
of state statutes.

46

After Winship, the Supreme Court refused to extend that decision to realize
the implications of constitutionalizing the reasonable doubt standard. 47 For
example, the Court deemed Winship inapplicable to the determination of the
degree of proof necessary to establish the voluntariness of a confession.48
Furthermore, the Court found that neither a jury instruction that every witness

The Burden of Proof and the Insanity Defense After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 28 ME. L. Rav. 435

(1977). See also Tate v. Powell, 325 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (Winship did not usurp the
power of state courts to define crime because that opinion failed to specify how the determination of necessary facts should be made). Because only the application of the reasonable doubt
standard to a larceny charge generally was at issue, the Court did not have occasion to examine
its applicability to each issue in the case, and the sweeping statement that "every fact necessary
to constitute the crime" need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt was unnecessary. See Allen,
supranote 31, at 31.
41. See Osenbaugh, supra note 7, at 437-42 for a discussion of the "elements" approach.
42. Several authors have noted this discomforting aspect of the elements analysis employed
by Winship. Assuming the Court intended to place no limit upon state power to define crime,
the Winship decision and the reasonable doubt standard could be easily circumvented by a
legislative reassignment of former elements as mitigating factors or affirmative defenses. See
Angel, supra note 35, at 94; Note, supra note 23, at 394.
43. It has been suggested that the Winship opinion's use of substantive due process
analysis based solely upon the command of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment indicates that a substantive reading of the case would be proper. See Angel, supra note
35, at 95 n.146.
44. Perhaps the Court's use of the term "fact," as opposed to "element" was designed to
emphasize the substantive due process implications of the decision. Note, Affirmative Defenses
in the Washington Criminal Code -The Impact of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 51 WAsH. L. REv.

953 (1976).
45. See Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law
-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Tax. L. Rv. 269, 270 (1977).

46. Id.
47. See Note, supra note 23, at 873.

48. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
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is presumed to testify truthfully,4 9 nor a conviction by less than a unanimous
jury verdict 50 contravened Winship.
Lower federal and state courts also viewed Winship narrowly, generally
understanding the decision to mandate an elements test.51 Accordingly, while
these courts invalidated both statutory presumptions and defenses which
burdened the defendant with disproving an element of the crime,52 they were
hesitant to invalidate affirmative defenses.53 Although several courts and com49. Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141 (1973). The Court in Cupp found that the overall
instructions emphasized the presumption of innocence and that the prosecution's duty to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt counteracted any prejudice the objectionable instruction
caused.
50. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). In Johnson the appellant sought to overturn
his conviction by arguing that the reasonable doubt standard required unanimous jury
verdicts. Denying the relief sought, the Court held that a 10 to 2 jury verdict did not necessarily mean that the state had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Court opined that the right to trial by jury required neither
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt nor a unanimous jury verdict. See Morano, Retreat
from Unanimity and Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases, 1 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 37 (1969),
for a discussion of the relationship between the reasonable doubt standard and jury verdicts.
51. Most courts understood Winship's importance to be its holding regarding the proof
standard at juvenile hearings. See Allen, supra note 45, at 270-71 n.10. Many courts also felt
the reasonable doubt rule had implications for civil commitment proceedings, because the
interests which motivated the Winship Court seemed present. See, e.g., In re Bally, 482 F.2d
648, 651 (1972) (proof of mental illness and dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment
must be beyond a reasonable doubt); Lessard v. Smith, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972)
(state must prove mental illness and dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt because the
individual will lose his civil rights and be stigmatized). See Comment, Burden of Proof Sexual Dangerousness Must Be Established Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 26 DEPAUL L. REv.
392, 394 (1977).
52. States applied Winship to various issues, but generally felt constrained to invalidate
only those which negated some element of the offense. See Osenbaugh, supra note 7, at 440;
Note, supra note 23, at 874. For example, certain statutory presumptions were deemed violative of Winship. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 547, 552, 336 A.2d
624, 627 (1975) (inference of knowledge of illegality from possession of stolen goods); State v.
Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541, 546, 520 P.2d 152, 155 (1974) (presumptive intent to commit crime
from possession of unlicensed pistol); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971) (presumption of malice unconstitutional). Winship has also been interpreted to demand proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of a mental disorder in civil commitment proceedings, People v.
Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal.3d 306, 310, 535 P.2d
852, 354, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 490 (1975); and to require a similar standard of proof of violation where a city ordinance involves possible imprisonment, City of St. Paul v. Whidly, 295
Minn. 129, 138-39, 203 N.W.2d 823, 828-29 (1972). In addition, states required proof that an
intoxicated defendant had specific intent, State v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973), and
to disprove alibi, Smith v. Smith, 454 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1971); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d
111 (8th Cir. 1968).
53. For example, because entrapment was a defense of "confession and avoidance" and
did not negate any element of the offense, courts upheld placing the burden of persuasion
upon the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied,
407 U.S. 923 (1972); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Foss, 10 Cal.
3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073 (1974). Other affirmative defenses also escaped invalidation after
Winship. See, e.g., Abner v. State, 233 Ga. 922, 213 S.E.2d 851 (1975) (accident); Commonwealth v. McKennion, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 160, 340 A.2d 889 (1975) (value of property to
establish lesser degree of crime); Hall v. Lockhart, 516 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1975); Parker v.
State, 222 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (insanity).
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mentators suggested that Winship should apply to affirmative defenses," state
power to legislatively and judicially designate the elements of the prosecution's
case generally remained inviolate.
EXTENDING

Winship - Mullaney v. Wilbur

Following uncertain application of the Winship decision by lower federal
and state courts,5 5 the Supreme Court confronted an opportunity to clarify the
scope of the reasonable doubt standard in Mullaney v. Wilbur.5 Defendant
Wilbur had been convicted57 under the Maine murder statute.58 On first appeal, 59 Wilbur argued that his due process rights had been violated by a jury
instruction specifying that malice should be presumed and that the defendant
must prove the presence of heat of passion on sudden provocation to reduce the
charge from murder to manslaughter.60 Because proof of heat of passion
negated malice, Wilbur asserted, allocating the persuasion burden to the defendant on that issue relieved the state of its constitutional duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the crime.61
While recognizing that Winship had applied the reasonable doubt standard
to state criminal actions, the Maine court nevertheless ruled that Maine's
statutory procedure had not improperly burdened the defendant in violation of
that standard. 62 The court reasoned that because guilt would already have been
established, the presumption of malice went only to the determination of the

54. See Note, Due Process and Supremacy as Foundation for the Adequacy Rule: The
Remains of Federalism After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 26 Mx. L. Rxv. 37, 42 (1974). Note, supra
note 36, at 836.
55. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
56. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57. Wilbur had argued at trial that he could not be convicted of an offense greater than
manslaughter because the slaying had been provoked by the homosexual advances of the deceased and was thus committed without malice. Id. at 685.
58. lt. REv. STAT. tit.
17, §2651 (1964), provides: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human
being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be
punished by imprisonment for life."
59. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (1971).
60. The jury had been instructed: "Bearing in mind... that there has been an unlawful
killing, that is one not justified in self defense, then the killing is presumed to be with malice
aforethought, and the burden is then upon the defendant, the killer, to satisfy the jury that it
was not done with malice aforethought either express or implied." Id. at 144.
This instruction accorded with Maine's manslaughter statute which in part provided:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation,
without express or implied malice aforethought... shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ...... MF.R.v. STAT. tit. 17, §2551
(1964). In practice, to establish murder the state was required to prove the killing was intentional and without legal justification or excuse. The burden then shifted to the defendant to
persuade the factfinder that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order
to mitigate the charge to manslaughter. See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common
Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B.U. L. Rry. 973, 976 (1974).
61. Wilbur raised his objection to the jury instruction on appeal before the Maine Court,
although he had failed to object at the trial. 421 U.S. at 688 & n.7.
62. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 146 (Me. 1971).
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degree of homicide.63 Winship, concerned solely with the determination of
64
guilt or innocence, would be inapplicable.
Wilbur petitioned successfully for habeas corpus relief,6s and after a com-

plex series of federal appeals66 the First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
his conviction.67 Reasoning that the presumption of malice assigned the burden
of persuasion to the defendant on a fact crucial to the assessment of punishment, the court found a violation of the reasonable doubt standard espoused
in Winship.68
63. "[N]o burden is imposed upon the defendant until the State has first convinced the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of a voluntary and intentional
homicide." Id. at 146. The court also commented that even if Winship were interpreted to
proscribe the procedural system under the Maine murder statute, there was no reason to
believe that decision would be applied retrospectively. Id.
64. The court construed the Maine statutes to create two distinct punishment categories
of the crime of felonious homicide, murder and manslaughter. In support the court presented
a historical analysis of jury charges in Maine murder cases and the development of the presumption of malice therein. Relying primarily upon State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857), and
State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 (1854), the court suggested Maine had always treated unlawful
killings as felonious homicide. Quoting Conley, the court commented: "[T]he felony actually
committed is the same, whether it has all the elements of murder ... or whether it is wanting
in the criterion of murder, and is therefore manslaughter. The two lower degrees of felonious
homicide are embraced in the charge of the higher offense .... " 278 A.2d at 144. See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B.U.L.
REv. 973 (1974).
65. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (D. Me. 1972). See generally the discussion of the
habeas corpus proceedings in Note, supra note 54.
66. The federal district court noted that felonious homicide had never appeared in
Maine's criminal statutes, and in addition, that murder and manslaughter were separately
defined, with malice aforethought the distinguishing element. 349 F. Supp. at 152-53. Therefore, the presumption of malice created by the Maine practice relieved the state of the burden
of persuasion on a fact critical not only to punishment, but also to the determination of the
crime committed.
In affirming, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Maine court had ignored
state precedent which might have led to a construction of the statutes consistent with that of
the district court. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 946 (Ist Cir. 1973) (citing State v. Merry,
136 Me. 243, 8 A.2d 143 (1939)); Collins v. Robbins, 147 Me. 163, 84 A.2d 536 (1951); State v.
Ernst, 150 Me. 449, 114 A.2d 369 (1955). Additionally, the circuit court referred to a 1963
Maine opinion, State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963), which it felt indicated that the
Maine courts construed murder and manslaughter as separate crimes. This led the circuit
court to conclude that Maine's Supreme Judicial Court had altered its view of the statutes to
avoid the impact of Winship. 473 F.2d at 945-46.
During the Wilbur appeals, the Maine courts had again ruled that Maine law contemplated
a single crime of felonious homicide with punishment categories of murder and manslaughter.
State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973). In specifically reasserting the statutory construction
outlined in State v. Wilbur, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court berated the federal courts for
interfering with its construction of Maine's laws. In view of Maine's reassertion of this interpretation, the United States Supreme Court remanded Wilbur's appeal to the circuit court
for reconsideration. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
67. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303, 1307 (1st Cir. 1974).
68. The circuit court rejected Maine's argument that because the presence of malice
became relevant only after the determination of guilt of felonious homicide, Winship was
inapplicable. The circuit court opined that Winship sought to protect the defendant's interests throughout the criminal proceeding and that the sentencing portion of the proceeding
implicated those interests as seriously as did the factfinding portion. Id. at 1307.
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Viewing the Maine statutory scheme as designating a single crime with
alternative punishment categories, the Supreme Court in Mullaneys9 addressed
the narrow issue of whether requiring the defendant to provide evidence
mitigating a felonious homicide from murder to manslaughter violated the due
process mandate of Winship.- As a purported foundation for analysis of the
Maine statute, the Court reviewed the historical allocation of the persuasion
burden as to malice7 1 The Court concluded that the presence or absence of
malice had traditionally been the critical determinant of the degree of culpability attaching to unlawful homicide and that the modern trend was to require
the prosecution to persuade the jury of the presence of malice7 2 Without explicating the constitutional significance of its historical analysis, 7 3 the Court
observed that although the prosecution need not establish malice to prove
criminality, the presence of malice affected the extent of punishment. 74 Noting
that the interests found critical in Winship75 were implicated not only by the
69. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). While recognizing state court authority
to interpret state law, the Court noted that in some situations, for example where a state court
interpretation was obviously designed to evade a federal issue, review of that interpretation
would be warranted. Id. at 691 n.11 (citing Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120,
129 (1945)); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Indiana ex.
rel. Ketchum, 194 U.S. 579 (1904). However, because the due process issue had not been
eliminated by Maine's interpretation of the statutes, the Court did not feel a reinterpretation
was warranted. See Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of the Criminal Law: An Examination
of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REv. 775, 787 (1975). See generally Hill,
The InadequateState Ground, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 943 (1965).
70. 421 U.S. at 692.
71. Id. at 692-96. Tracing the presence of the distinction between murder and manslaughter based on "malice propensed" as far back as the 16th century, the Court concluded
that at common law the defendant shouldered the burden of proving heat of passion on
sudden provocation. Id. at 693-94 (citing The King v. Oneby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1727)
and 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CommENTARms 201). But see, Fletcher, supra note 5, at 904-07 (wherein
the author argues reliance upon Oneby's case was improper and misleading).
The concept of malice aforethought in this country, the Court explained, signified a substantive element of intent in some jurisdictions, requiring proof by the prosecution; in other
jurisdictions the concept remained a policy presumption, indicating that absent proof to the
contrary the presence of malice was presumed. Though many courts had required the defendant to prove he acted in the heat of passion in order to negate malice, the United States
Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), had rejected this approach,
requiring in a federal case that the prosecution persuade the trier of fact that malice existed.
Subsequently, however, the Court had refused to hold Davis applicable to the states. Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). 421 U.S. at 692-96. See generally Note, Constitutional Law:
The Burden of Proof for Affirmative Defenses in Homicide Cases, 12 WAKE FomST L. REv.
423 (1975).
72. 421 U.S. at 696.
73. While the Court suggested that a historical review of the heat of passion defense
would "illuminate" the analysis, id. at 692, the Court never subsequently explained the
relevance of that review.
74. Id. at 698-99.
75. Several authors have suggested that the three interests purportedly served by Winship's adoption of the reasonable doubt standard may be condensed to a single concern- that
persons not be deprived of their liberty without due process. As has been noted, community
confidence in the state system of criminal justice lacks constitutional dimension, since citizens'
perception of the function of the law implicates no federal interest. See, Allen, supra note 45,
at 280; Tushnet, sura note 69, at 799-800.
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determination of guilt or innocence but also by the assigned degree of
culpability, the Mullaney Court suggested that to protect those interests the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of the fact
upon which the higher degree of culpability turned.7 6
In ruling the Maine practice violative of due process, Mullaney seemingly
extended the definition of "facts necessary to constitute the crime charged" to
facts bearing not only upon guilt or innocence but also upon the severity of
punishment or degree of culpability." Theoretically this extension would prevent states from circumventing the Winship mandate by redefining the elements of a crime and thereby decreasing the prosecution's burden without
altering the substantive law. As elucidated by Mullaney, therefore, Winship
commanded that a state practice be gauged not by a due process analysis limited
to the formal elements, but rather by analysis of the substance of the crime, including facts pertinent to the degree of culpability. Mullaney essentially prescribed an assessment of the operation and effect of the statute and a balancing
of individual and state interests to decide whether shifting the persuasion
burden to the defendant comported with due process.78 Analyzing Maine procedure in this way, the Court found that the defendant's interests outweighed
the state's evidentiary problems in proving the absence of provocation.7 9
Mullaney left unanswered many questions posed by the Winship decision.
While clarifying to an extent the facts which must be proved by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Mullaney Court nevertheless failed to explain
how to isolate such facts.80 Because absence of provocation was not an element
of felonious homicide under Maine's formulation, Mullaney indicated that a
strict elements approach would be improper.8 1 This limited instruction regard76. 421 U.S. at 698. Although Winship had concerned solely the determination of guilt
or innocence, Mullaney suggested that the thrust of Winship was to prevent the defendant
from being convicted of a more serious crime than he had actually committed. The degree of
culpability, which determines the extent of punishment, affects the defendant's

interests

greatly. Therefore, the Mullaney Court decided that it was justifiable to impose the persuasion
burden on the prosecution to prove those facts upon which the more severe punishment was
based.
77. In rebutting Maine's argument that Winship should be limited to definitional elements of the crime, the Court responded that "[t]his analysis fails to recognize that the
criminal law . . . is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with
the degree of criminal culpability." 421 U.S. at 697-98.
78. Id. at 698-99.
79. Id. at 701-02.
80. It has been suggested that Mullaney essentially restates the Winship mandate, explaining that necessary "facts" actually means that the substance of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 828, 835 (1975). The Mullaney Court expressed this preference for

substance over form in suggesting Winship should not be limited to the elements of the
state's case defined by the statute. 421 U.S. at 697-98.
81. In adopting Maine's construction of the statutes, the Court acknowledged that malice
did not constitute an element of felonious homicide. Thus, by requiring that the prosecution
bear the persuasion burden on the presence of malice, Winship was extended to collateral
facts affecting punishment. See Note, supra note 36, at 186. Although the decision offered no

clear method for specifying facts which must be proved by the state, Mullaney seemed to
eliminate the possibility that a state could simply denominate what had formerly been an

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss2/5

14

Sullivan: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Dou

1979]

99REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

ing the proper test seemed an admonishment that where punishment differs
significantly between two crimes or degrees of the same crime, requiring the
defendant to bear the burden of persuasion as to the distinguishing factors
contravenes due process.8 2 In other words, Mullaney apparently required the
prosecution to bear the risk of nonpersuasion on all issues critical to culpability; that is, all issues which must be resolved prior to sentencing 3 Thus, the
prosecution must prove not only statutorily designated elements, but also facts
which must be found absent prior to a resolution of the defendant's fault, or
degree thereof.84
Left similarly unanswered was whether Mullaney should be interpreted as
merely a procedural ruling, designating the proper allocation of the burden of
persuasion once a state has defined a crime, or as a substantive holding, restricting the state's power to define criminal behavior. Support for the procedural
interpretation is found in the Court's reluctance to alter Maine's construction
of the murder and manslaughter statutes. Instead, the Court directed allocation
of the persuasion burden for facts deemed pertinent by the state.85
Read as having solely a procedural effect, Mullaney in no way impedes state
power to define crime and thus prevents federal intervention into state substantive law.88 Once a state designates the facts bearing upon guilt or the degree
element as an affirmative defense, thereby relieving the prosecution of the burden of persuasion on that fact.
82. Mullaney might be viewed as holding that where proof of a fact would reduce the
offense charged to one of lesser criminal culpability, although that proof would not entirely
exonerate the accused, due process demands the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of this fact. See Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction, Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977).
Such an interpretation emphasizes the effect of the state's definition of a particular crime
rather than the formal statutory designation of elements. See Note, supra note 31, at 396. This
reasoning led one author to conclude that after Mullaney, allocating the burden of persuasion
to the defendant as to insanity violates due process if in so doing the defendant must prove
factual elements constituting the mens rea required for the crime. Thus, only where elements
establishing insanity are not inconsistent with the mental capacity essential to the offense may
the persuasion burden on those facts be shifted to the defendant. See Note, supra note 16, at
499.
83. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 5, at 171.
84. Comment, supra note 36, at 832. As otherwise expressed: "It should thus be a violation of due process to impose upon a defendant the burden of proof of any fact the establishment of which will significantly affect the degree to which his fundamental interests in liberty
and reputation may be comprised." Note, supra note 31, at 395.
85. This narrow interpretation of Mullaney compromises between total state control and
significant federal intervention into state substantive law. While a state may choose to exclude
a fact entirely from relevance to the crime, if the state decides instead to include the fact
either as an element or as a mitigating factor, the state must bear the persuasion burden. See
Angel, supra note 35, at 100. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals had commented in initially
assessing Mullaney: "So long as the Maine Statute defines murder as an intentional killing
with malice aforethought,... the burden must be on the state to establish [malice]." Wilbur
v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 948 (Ist Cir. 1973).
86. Mullaney has elicited comment suggesting a solely procedural interpretation would be
proper. See Note, People v. Patterson: The Constitutionality of New York's Affirmative Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance,51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 158, 178 (1976). See also Evans
v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975), where the Maryland court ex-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

of punishment, due process demands that the prosecution bear the burden of
persuasion as to each fact.sr In sum, a procedural interpretation would allow a
state either to include a fact relevant to guilt or punishment within the statutory scheme and to require the prosecution to shoulder the persuasion burden,
or to eliminate that fact even as a mitigating circumstance.,
Mullaney could also be interpreted as a substantive decision 9 providing a
federal inroad into the states' authority to define criminal activity. 90 Had the
case concerned solely procedural issues, the only question regarding the prosecution's duty to bear the burden of persuasion should have been whether, under
the state's scheme, the fact in issue affected the existence or degree of culpability. The historical basis of the fact's inclusion as an element would have been
of no significance. 91 Thus, while the Court purported to accept Maine's construction of its own statutes, the concern for historical relevance may have
implied that certain historically relevant facts, such as malice, must be included
within the definition of a crime. 92 The reasonable doubt standard therefore
may have been viewed by the Court as a limit on the state's legislative and
judicial authority to designate the essentials of a crime and as a basis for fedpressed the view that Mullaney and Winship were "concerned exclusively with due process,
the modality or process by which we do certain things in the criminal law. They are concerned
with the criminal law's procedures and not with its substance. It is, therefore, not the definitions or elements of our various grades of felonious homicide that require scrutiny under
Mullaney v. Wilbur and Winship, but rather our mechanical, evidentiary and procedural
devices. The ultimate concern is not ... what we do but ... how we do it." Id. at 674, 349
A.2d at 323.
87. Interpreting Mullaney in this fashion, it would seem that all affirmative defenses
would be invalid. See Allen, supra note 31, at 39.
88. Low ,- Jefferies, Dicta: Constitutionalizingthe Criminal Law? VA. L. WKLY., March 25,
1977, at 1 (1977). A procedural analysis under Mullaney would focus on how the state allocates the burden of persuasion after defining the crime, rather than upon which facts are
included within that definition. This procedural interpretation might nevertheless limit state
power to define crime, because after Mullaney, where the fact in consideration is one of historical relevance, the state would apparently be required to either include or exclude the
fact as an element, but could not retain the fact and require the defendant bear the persuasion burden. Therefore, one disadvantage of a procedural interpretation may be its
tendency to discourage states from creating new ameliorative affirmative defenses. Id.at 3. See
note 154 infra.
89. There are, however, indications to the contrary. Justice Powell, author of the Mullaney
opinion, dissented in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and specified that Mullaney,
as well as Winship, had been concerned solely with procedural requirements of due process.
90. Such an expansive interpretation of Mullaney, which one commentator termed a
"natural law" view, would read the decision to require that states include certain facts as
relevant to the crime and that they persuade the jury as to the existence or non-existence of
these facts. See Angel, supra note 35, at 101.

91. Mullaney may, therefore, have been intended to require that a mental element be
included in the definition of the crime, thereby preventing the imposition of strict criminal
liability. Arguably, had the Court conducted solely a procedural review, the Maine statute

would have been upheld as creating a permissible presumption. See Tushnet, supra note 69,
at 780.
92.

The logical extension of this argument would be that where historically a state has

distinguished between two crimes, or two degrees of the same crime, on the basis of a particular fact, the state may not constitutionally eliminate that distinction from its laws.
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eral courts to determine, as a matter of due process, the constitutionally re93
quired minimum elements.
Mullaney raised another question closely related to the procedural/substantive dichotomy. In rejecting Maine's contention that Winship had prescribed
an elements analysis, 94 the Court indicated that the state's decision to distinguish between two degrees of felonious homicide dictated that the prosecution
carry the persuasion burden on the distinguishing fact.95 Although Mullaney
involved a statutory presumption,9 8 its language regarding distinctions encouraged speculation that the Court may have impliedly destroyed the justification for use of affirmative defenses. 97 Such a conclusion is understandable because affirmative defenses mitigate punishment and thus distinguish between
degrees of criminal culpability.9 Even though states have traditionally allocated the burden of persuasion to defendants on matters denominated afflirmative defenses, 99 extending the Mullaney rationale to those issues seems justified
both because the Winship interests are significantly affected and because the
inability to reach such defenses would enable states to evade Winship by
designating former elements as affirmative defenses. 0o
NARROWING TE

Winship/Mullaney DOCTRINE

-

Pattersonv. New York
Less than two years after Mullaney, Pattersonv. New York010 provided the
Supreme Court with another opportunity to clarify the due process implications of imposing persuasion burdens upon criminal defendants. The defendant
in Patterson had been convicted under a New York statute1 02 which defined
murder to consist of two elements: intent to cause the death of another person
93. Reading Mullaney as a substantive decision admits that the reasonable doubt
standard limits state power to draw and interpret homicide statutes, and presumably statutes
on other crimes as well. See Low & Jefferies, supra note 88, at 3. Such an interpretation would
make the determination of a crime's minimum elements a federal question, thus departing
from the federal system's traditional deference to state authority in this area. See note 69
supra.
94. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 697.
95. Id. at 698.
96. But see Allen, supra note 31, at 32. (Maine employed a traditional affirmative defense).
97. See Note, supra note 23, at 875-76.
98. 421 U.S. at 697-98.
99. McCosnucK, supra note 4, §346.
100. For a discussion of the state court application of Mullaney see Note, supra note 23,
at 878-79 nn.53-59.
101. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
102. N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.25 (McKinney 1975). Section 125.25 provides: "A person is
guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: (a) the defendant acted under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation
or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the defendant's situation under circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing
contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a
conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime."
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and causing the death of that person or some third person.103 The statute provided an affirmative defense for the defendant who could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under extreme emotional disturbance for which there existed a reasonable excuse.10 4 Upon proof of extreme
05
emotional disturbance, the modern equivalent of the heat of passion defense,
the defendant would be found guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter. 0 6
After the Mullaney decision, the constitutionality of the New York murder
statute had been questioned by that state's lower courts. Although New York
denominated extreme emotional disturbance an affirmative defense, these state
07
courts on three occasions had declared the statute violative of due process.
Finding New York's scheme the functional equivalent of the Maine statute,
these courts had reasoned that imposition of the burden of persuasion contravened the spirit of Mullaney. 0 8
103. 432 U.S. at 198.
104. See note 102 supra.
105. The common law concept of heat of passion on sudden provocation had been
criticized as too inflexible and outdated. 432 U.S. at 218. Therefore, in preparing a Model
Penal Code, the American Law Institute developed the slightly broader concept of extreme
emotional disturbance. Id. See MODEL PENAL CODE §201.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959).
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW (1972); Wechsler, Codification of Criminal
Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968). New York
adopted this ALI proposal as a basis for distinguishing between murder and manslaughter
with only a few alterations. By far the most significant change was the New York drafters'
decision to require that the defendant prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance
by designating it an affirmative defense. 432 U.S. at 218-19. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§125.20(2),
125.25(l)(a) (McKinney 1975). The Model Penal Code, in contrast, had made extreme emotional disturbance a defense on which the prosecution had the persuasion burden once the
defendant came forward with evidence sufficient to raise the issue. 432 U.S. at 218-21 (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE §§1.12, 210.3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also Allen, supra note 31,
at 54.
106. The New York manslaughter statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.20[2] (McKinney 1975)
provides: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: 2. With intent to cause
the death of another person he causes the death of such person or of a third person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of §125.25. The fact
that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need
not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection." The Court instructed the
jury that "the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the
first degree.... This does not mean that the emotional disturbance exonerates the killer, or
renders his killing guiltless. As long as he actually intended to cause the death of another
person *** the killing remains a crime, and remains a homicide, but is punishable in a less
severe manner than murder." People v. Patterson 39 N.Y.2d 288, 293, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576,
347 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1976).
107. People v. Davis, 49 App. Div. 2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (4th Dept. 1975), reu'd, 40
N.Y.2d 835, 837 N.Y.S.2d 837, 356 N.E.2d 290 (1976); People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372
N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Woods, 84 Misc. 2d 301, 375 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct.

1975).
108. In People v. Davis, 49 App. Div. 2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (4th Dept. 1975), the court
noted that certain affirmative defenses had previously been upheld after Mullaney, but that
these affirmative defenses had been unknown at common law; thus no shift of the burden of
proof occurred when the defendant was assigned that burden.
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Despite these lower court rulings, the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Patterson0 9 upheld the murder statute against due process arguments. Without referring to the prior contrary New York decisions, the court noted that the
statute required the prosecution to prove each fact essential to conviction, including intent." o Distinguishing Mullaney, the court suggested that the due
process flaw in the Maine statute was the requirement that the defendant
negate an element of the offense - malice.'" The court therefore determined
that Mullaney had merely applied Winship in finding that the reasonable
doubt standard had been violated by the allocation to the defendant of the
burden of negating an element necessary to the basic charge." 2 Because the
New York statute did not require the defendant to negate any element of the
3
offense, the court upheld the statute as consistent with due process."1
4
The United States Supreme Court affirmed,"1 ruling that the defendant's
duty to persuade the jury of the validity of the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance accorded with due process principles set out in Winship.
The Court first explained that the New York statute obligated the prosecution
to prove two essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: intent to kill, and
occurrence of death as a result of that intent."1 As analyzed by the Court, the
statute neither inferred nor presumed any facts against the defendant;"16 moreover, the defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not negate any element
of the state's case."17 This finding suggested the New York legislature had successfully avoided the problems encountered in Mullaney because New York
had entirely eliminated malice from the definition of the crime. Thus, in the
Court's view, the New York statute, both in form and substance, satisfied the
Winship mandate that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged."B
ComparativeAnalysis: The Maine and New York Statutes
The message of Winship and Mullaney, as explicated by Patterson, unfortunately appears to be that state legislatures can avoid due process problems
through careful statutory draftsmanship. Although functionally the New York
and Maine murder statutes appear nearly indentical, the Patterson majority

109. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976).
110. Id. at 302, 383 N.YS.2d at 582, 347 N.E.2d at 907.
Ill. Id.
112. This interpretation ignores the construction of the Maine statute by that state's
courts which had consistently ruled that malice was not an element of murder under the
Maine practice. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
113. The court based its decision upon two basic findings: that Maine employed a presumption to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving an element of intent; and that
Mullaney had merely applied, and not extended, Winship's due process mandate. See Note,
supra note 36, at 176.
114. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 206 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
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identified a very formalistic distinction, the use of an affirmative defense rather
than a presumption, as the saving feature of the New York scheme.
Maine defined murder as unlawful killing, with malice aforethought express
or implied.119 As interpreted by Maine's courts, however, murder was but one
degree of the offense of felonious homicide, a crime which consisted of the
elements of intent to kill and the actual killing of another person. 2 0 Thus, to
support the initial determination of guilt of felonious homicide, the prosecution did not have to prove malice.121 While accepting this construction of the
Maine statute, 1 22 the Mullaney Court deemed the law unconstitutional because
the presumption of malice, although not relevant to guilt or innocence, placed
upon the defendant the burden of disproving a fact which affected the degree
of stigma and the extent of loss of liberty.
In an attempt to narrow Mullaney, the Patterson majority asserted that
malice had constituted an element of murder under the Maine practice;123
therefore, the presumption of malice violated due process by relieving the
prosecution of the obligation to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This
interpretation directly contradicted the Maine court's construction of the
statute, to which the Supreme Court had subscribed in Mullaney.124 Adoption
of this interpretation allowed the Patterson majority to limit Mullaney to
proscribe allocation of the persuasion burden to a defendant on facts the state
considers so integral in the definition of a crime that they must be either proved
or presumed.12 5 Thus, Patterson misinterpreted Mullaney, by reading that decision to forbid requiring a defendant to disprove an element.126 In reality, the
Maine practice invalidated in Mullaney had required the defendant to prove a
mitigating fact.
Applying what purported to be an identical method of analysis to the New
York statute, the Patterson Court noted that death, intent, and causation were
119. See note 59 supra.
120. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 687, 690-92 (1975); State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me.
1973); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).
121. 421 U.S. at 690-92.
122. Id.
123. 432 U.S. at 213. The majority apparently reasoned that the presence of the phrase
"malice aforethought" in the definition of the crime, and the designation of the negative of
malice, provocation, as an affirmative defense was inconsistent and might confuse the jury as to
who had the persuasion burden on the issue.
124. See cases cited at note 107 supra.
125. The Patterson Court construed the Maine murder statute to allow a defendant to
rebut a statutory presumption that he committed the offense with malice aforethought by
proving he had acted in the heat of passion. Since the Court erroneously interpreted the
intent required by the statute to include malice as an element, it assumed the Mullaney decision was based upon a finding that the statute improperly shifted the persuasion burden on
an element.
126. See note 125 supra. The State of New York had advanced this argument on appeal.
The thrust of the argument was that the Maine practice had only required the prosecution to
prove the requisite intent for manslaughter and presumed from that proof the intent required
for murder. The state thus suggested the flaw in Maine's procedure was burdening the defendant with proof of the absence of an element of intent necessary to establish murder. See
Brief for Appellee at 10; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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the sole elements of murder under New York law.127 Malice comprised neither
128
a part of the statutory definition nor an element of the prosecution's case.
Upholding the statute against a due process attack based upon Mullaney, the

Court reasoned that because New York utilized an affirmative defense which
shifted no persuasion burden to the defendant until after guilt had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, the New York statute avoided the flaw
fatal to Maine's practice. In reaching this conclusion Patterson ignored Mullaney's acceptance of the Maine courts' construction of the murder statute, and
consequently drew a formalistic distinction between the two states' practices
as a basis for upholding the New York formulation.
In both Maine and New York, all substantive elements of the crime of
29
murder had to be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt'
Similarly, in each state only the existence or non-existence of a single fact heat of passion in Maine and extreme emotional disturbance in New York distinguished murder from manslaughter. As interpreted by the highest courts
of each state, neither of these mitigating circumstances negated any substantive
element of the crime.130 Because these statutes so closely paralleled each other
in practical effect, the PattersonCourt's explanation for invalidity of the Maine
formulation seems equally applicable to the New York statute. Just as the
Maine statute was construed to have in effect created another substantive element of felonious homicide in the form of absence of heat of passion, absence
of extreme emotional disturbance should have been similarly objectionable
under the New York statute.
In addition to this practical resemblance, the statutes implemented a policy
decision to treat all intentional killings as murder unless the defendant proved
mitigating circumstances.' 3 ' The sole distinction between the statutes appears
to be that Maine, by defining murder to include malice aforethought, in effect
placed a label upon the absence of heat of passion, thereby appearing to create
a presumption of malice. New York, in contrast, excluded malice from the
definition of murder by refusing to specifically label the absence of extreme
emotional disturbance, thereby employing an affirmative defense rather than a
presumption. 32 Because the Maine courts determined that the presence or
absence of malice was unimportant in initially establishing the defendant's
guilt, however, in practice the heat of passion defense negated no element of
127. 432 U.S. at 198.
128. Interestingly, the Court stated that the New York statute had not included in the
definition of murder either the term "malice" or any description of such an element of intent. This marks the Court's initial attempts at distinguishing Mullaney, which had included
the term "malice" within the definition of murder, although not within the prosecutions case.
129. Compare the instructions given to the jury in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 685-86, with the
jury instructions in Patterson,432 U.S. at 200 n-5.
130. See State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973); People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288,
383 N.Y.S.2d 578, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976).
131. See generally Note, supra note 36.
132. New York defined murder without any reference to malice for the express reason of
avoiding the problems Maine had encountered. See THRD IrmuErI

REPORT OF THETEMPoRARY

STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF TIE PENAL LAW AND CRI14INAL CODE, N.Y.

Legis. Doc. No.

25, at 22 (1964) cited in Note, supra note 86, at 187 p.77.
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the crime and therefore operated as an affirmative defense. 33 Thus, employing
a highly formalistic analysis, the Patterson Court distinguished the Maine and
New York statutes solely by the use of the term malice in Maine's definition of
murder.
Further evidence that the Pattersonmajority relied on a technical difference
between the labels of statutory presumption and affirmative defense may be
gleaned from the Court's use of the decisions in Leland v. Oregon 3 4 and Rivera
v. Delaware'35 as authority for its holding. In Leland, a pre-Winship case, a

state practice requiring the defendant to prove insanity was found permissible
because the prosecution retained the burden of proving each element of the
offense 1 36 One author interpreted Winship and Mullaney to render Leland's
rationale obsolete, because even though insanity was not an element considered
in determining guilt, it had a significant effect on the degree of culpability and
extent of punishment. 3 7 The Supreme Court dispelled such speculation in
Rivera, however, by dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to
Delaware's requirement that a defendant prove insanity. The Court in Rivera
emphasized that Delaware had made insanity an affirmative defense to be considered by the jury only after the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt all elements of the offense, including mens rea. 38 Leland and Rivera
appeared to suggest that once a state designates an affirmative defense, and does
not include that fact or its negative as an element of the offense, the burden of
persuading the jury of this affirmative defense may be placed upon the defendant. Thus, because New York had labelled extreme emotional disturbance
133. It has been suggested that the Maine statute had not created a presumption in the
traditional sense, because there was no basic fact from which could be presumed the presence
of the forward fact, malice. On the contrary, the Maine practice, as in New York, was to place
the persuasion burden upon the defendant from the outset. See Allen, supra note 31, at 57
nn.94-100. Thus, the Maine statute in effect created an affirmative defense, and Mullaney
might therefore be read to have proscribed more than presumptions.
134. 348 U.S. 790 (1952).
135. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
136. 343 U.S. at 799. At issue in Leland was the constitutionality, under the due process
clause, of an Oregon rule requiring that the defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
137. See, e.g., Note, supra note 23, at 874-76 n.31.
138. Justice Rhenquist had concurred in Mullaney and expressed the view that no inconsistency existed between that decision and Leland. Rhenquist reasoned that the Oregon
procedure in Leland required proof of intent, but that the presence or absence of legal sanity
bore no necessary relationship to this required mental element. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 705-06 (1952) (Rhenquist, J., concurring). Rivera seemingly confirmed this view. Several
courts relied upon these opinions in holding that a defendant could be required to prove
sanity. See, e.g., Buzysnki v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1976); Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 200
S.E.2d 248 (1973); State v. Caddeel, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
It is interesting to note that the Patterson Court in discussing Rivera refers to insanity as
an affirmative defense, and in discussing Leland refers to insanity as a defense. 432 U.S. at 212.
Under the analysis employed in Patterson, presumably the insanity defense in Leland would
have been saved from constitutional violation because insanity did not negate any element of
the offense. Patterson might be read, then, as permitting the imposition of the persuasion
burden upon the defendant to prove not only an affirmative defense, but any defense which
does not negate an element of the crime.
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as an affirmative defense, the PattersonCourt concluded that the statute passed
due process scrutiny. The Patterson opinion indicates that the form of the
statute, rather than the substance of the crime controls the due process rights
accorded a defendant. This reverence for form ignores the due process mandate
originated in Winship and extended in Mullaney. The latter opinion had
refused to limit Winship to the definitional elements of the crime prescribed by
statute. Patterson's choice to rely on cases sanctioning the use of affirmative
defenses where the affirmative defense did not negate any element of the state's
case239 neglects Mullaney's indication that due process forbids burdening the
defendant with proof of any fact having a significant effect on the degree of
culpability.
Reexamining In re Winship
Although admitting an intent to narrow the Mullaney decision in scope and
effect,1*0 the Patterson Court purported to apply Winship.141 Arguably, however, Pattersonmay have limited Winship's applicability. One indication that
the Court has constricted the function of the reasonable doubt standard,
thereby restricting the extent of federal examination of state substantive law,
appears in the reformulation of the due process standard enunciated in Winship. Claiming adherence to established due process principles, the Patterson
Court articulated a standard that required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
all "elements" of the offense.1 42 This formulation misstates the Winship holding that all "facts" necessary to convict must be proved. 43 By substituting the
term "element" for "fact," the Patterson majority presumably intended the
reasonable doubt standard to obligate the prosecution to prove only legislatively or judicially designated elements and not all facts relevant to the degree
of culpability.
A second indication that Pattersonhas narrowed Winship surfaces in the
Court's discussion of the policy effectuated by the reasonable doubt standard.
Winship had recognized the fundamental value determination "that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."'14 The
PattersonCourt nevertheless noted that there are limits to the risk of allowing
the guilty to go free beyond which a state need not venture.

45

Thus, Patterson

questioned the very foundation of the Winship decision.
Patterson'sfailure to use the interests specified in Winship for determining
139. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 690-91.
140. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 204-05.
141. Id. at 211.
142. Id. at 214.
143. Winship had mandated "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime ... charged." 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
144. 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
145. "While it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden
in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without
limits .... Due process- does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever
cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person." Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. at 208.
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whether a state practice allocates the burden of persuasion consistent with due
process is a final indication that the Court intended to alter the original
formulation of the reasonable doubt standard. Both Winship and Mullaney
had designated the liberty and reputation of the defendant as well as the community's confidence in the criminal justice system as vital interests to be safeguarded by any statutory scheme. Patterson, however, referred to neither the
defendant's interest in reputation nor the community's confidence in the
criminal law. Although these two interests may merely restate the defendant's
interest in liberty,146 their absence from the Court's analysis further shows an
14
emphasis on the statute's form rather than its effect. 7
APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT
STANDARD IN THE LOWER COURTS

AFTER Patterson

The absence of a clear constitutional rule for application of the reasonable
doubt standard could have been remedied by the Patterson decision. By declining to specify the proper implementation of that standard, the Court left
lower courts the task of balancing the state and federal interests at stake in
criminal proceedings. The result has been the adoption of three distinct interpretations of Patterson,each according a different degree of protection to the
defendant's interests of liberty and reputation.
The Elements Approach
The traditional approach to determining which facts the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements test, requires that the prosecution persuade the jury of the existence of each fact that the state's judiciary and
legislature have deemed essential to a determination of guilt.,

On all issues

146. See note 75 supra.
147. Because the defenses of heat of passion on sudden provocation and extreme emotional disturbance are essentially the same, see note 112 supra, one implication of Patterson
may be that a particular fact's historical significance no longer has an influence upon how the
persuasion burden as to that fact is allocated. Justice Powell contests such a conclusion in his
dissent in Pattersonand suggests that Winship and Mullaney contemplated a two-step analysis
of any state practice assigning persuasion burdens. The prosecution must bear that burden,
Powell contends, where the fact at issue has a significant effect upon stigma and punishment
and also has been historically important in defining the crime. 432 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Requiring that the fact have historical significance renders moot the majority's
fear that innovation in the criminal law would be stifled by a broad reading of Winship and
Mullaney. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 214 n.15.
148. See Osenbaugh, supra note 7, at 39. The elements approach might appropriately be
described as specifying that a court engage in statutory construction, determining which facts
define the offense and which provide mitigating factors. New York had argued throughout the
Patterson appeals that the courts were bound by the New York court's construction. See Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 7, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
One often cited component of the elements test, the physical location rule, makes the position of a fact within the statute determinative of whether that fact is an element of the offense. As explained in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971): "[W]hen an exception is
incorporated in the enacting clause of a statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead
and prove that the defendant is not within the exception." See also 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE §§24-33 (13th ed. 1972). The validity of such an approach has been questioned,
however. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS 240-43 (1964).
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extraneous to this definition, the defendant may be allocated the burden of
persuasion.149 In analyzing an affirmative defense under an elements approach,
the crucial question historically was whether the defense negated an element of
the offense or whether it was an additional matter of justification or excuse.1 50
The Winship and Mullaney decisions heralded the demise of this strict test by
extending the due process standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
matters not expressly within the elements of the prosecution's case. This extension invited federal intervention into the determination of state substantive
law by allowing federal courts to specify the minimum elements required for
proof of guilt. Patterson has apparently reversed this trend and removed the
justification for federal court review of state substantive criminal law.151 The
Patterson majority's emphasis on the technical distinction between presumptions and affirmative defenses1s 2 and its willingness to restrict the scope of the
reasonable doubt standard espoused in Winship indicate that the Court may be
prescribing the traditional elements approach.
If interpreted as espousing an elements approach,153 the Pattersondecision
acknowledges the importance of state power to define criminal behavior by
149. A second principle of statutory construction associated with the elements approach
focuses upon the severability of a fact from the definition of the criminal offense without
creating a vague description. Generally, where the "'offense contains an exception, in the
enacting clause, which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the
ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is
omitted.... an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the
accused is not within the exception, but if the language of the clause defining the offense is
so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be
accurately and dearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely
omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is a matter of defense and
must be shown by the accused."' Kirchner v. Johnstone, 454 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
citing Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa. Super. 216, 219 (1922).
150. See McCoRmicK, supra note 4, §346.
151. See notes 89-93 supra.
152. In general, statutory presumptions establish the existence of a presumed fact, an
element of the offense, by proof of a basic fact. McCoRMix, supra note 4, §346; Note, supra
note 86, at 170. The constitutional limitations placed upon the use of presumptions in
criminal statutes require the presence of a rational connection between the basic fact and the
presumed fact. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See also Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (where the Court explained that a rational connection exists only if once
the basic fact has been proved it is more likely than not that the presumed fact exists).
Affirmative defenses permit a defendant to exonerate himself, or at least mitigate his
punishment, by showing the existence of collateral facts which justify or excuse the commission of the crime. Because affirmative defenses concern facts collateral to the definition of
the crime, no rational connection between the elements of the offense and the absence of the
affirmative defense need exist. McCoRcK, supra note 4, §346. Compare Ashford & Risinger,
supra note 5 (rational connection test should be applied to affirmative defenses) with Christie
& Pye, supra note 25 (rational connection test inappropriate for testing affirmative defenses).
Requiring such a connection might discourage legislatures from including the affirmative
defense within the statute. See 432 U.S. at 213, where the Court suggests that states may not be
forced to choose between proving or excluding the affirmative defense. See also note 5 supra.
153. "We, therefore, will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the
Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged." 432 U.S.
at 210.
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refusing to analyze the constitutionally required substance of the offense. The
danger of such reverence for state legislative and judicial authority would be
the possibility of invasion of the defendant's due process interests of liberty and
freedom from stigmatization. Such a danger would exist because states could
conceivably define a criminal act to consist of minimal facts, thereby reducing
significantly the force and effect of the reasonable doubt standard. 54
Exemplary of the analysis encouraged by adherence to an elements theory is
the recent federal court decision in United States ex. rel. Kirchner v. Johnstone.155 Defendants there were tried and convicted on a charge of possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver, in violation of a Pennsylvania statute which
prohibited "manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance" by a person not registered under the statute nor
licensed as a practitioner by the state. 156 The statute further required that a
defendant prove the applicability of any exception or exemption that he
claimed.1r7 In seeking habeas corpus relief-51 the defendants alleged that the
state had not proved an essential element of the offense: that the defendants
were neither registered, nor licensed as practitioners. 59
On review, the federal court understood the sole issue to be whether non60
registration constituted an essential element of the offense.' This determinaAt least one commentator has suggested that the Patterson Court qualified this comment
by indicating that the state must prove "some but not all affirmative defenses." Allen, supra
note 31, at 49. This author suggests that the Court has posited a proportionality test to be
applied in assessing criminal statutes. Such a test would direct a court to determine whether
the punishment prescribed would be justified under an eighth amendment analysis of the
facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Where the court finds the maximum punisment proportional to the state's burden of proof, the presence of additional
mitigating factors in the form of affirmative defenses on which the defendant bears the
persuasion burden does not violate due process. Thus, the defendant's liberty and reputation
interests are afforded adequate protection. Id. Other authors have suggested, however, that an
elements analysis has been presented by the Patterson decision and that courts need only
consult the statutory formula to determine the prosecution's burden. See Henderson & Klafter,
Criminal Procedure, [19781 ANN. SuRvEY AM. L. 17, 34.
154. See Comment, Patterson v. New York: Defendant Must Carry Burden of Proof in
Affirmative Defense, 3 NAT. J. CRIM. DEF. 289, 301 (1977). The Patterson Court did suggest
there were some constitutional limits beyond which states may not go in exercising authority
to define the substance of a crime. "[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare
The legislature cannot 'validly
an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime ....
command that the finding of an indictment or mere proof of the identity of the accused,
should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.' " 432 U.S. at
210, citing McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916). In addition, the
Court noted that while states had always had the power to create affirmative defenses and
redefine crimes, no trend of saddling defendants with substantial persuasion burdens formerly
imposed upon the state had been evidenced in the past. Id. at 211 n.12.
155. 454 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
156. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §780-113 (1978).
157. Id. §780-121.
158. Both petitioners filed for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1978).
454 F. Supp. at 15 (1978).
159. Id.
160. The court acknowledged that if non-registration were found to be an essential element, the Winship and Patterson decisions would require the state to bear the persuasion
burden on that issue. Id.
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tion, the court opined, merely involved discerning what facts the state courts
had deemed essential to a determination of guilt. Rather than analyzing the
nature of the crime and deciding which facts, if proved, would warrant imposition of the statutorily prescribed punishment, the court adopted the construction of the statute offered by the state judiciary. 161 While recognition of the
state's power to interpret its criminal statutes is unobjectionable in itself, refusal to do more than determine the elements deemed essential by the state
increases the possibility of undermining the defendant's due process interests.
Such reluctance to intrude on the powers of the state legislature and courts
leaves those powers unchecked. 162 Although state assignments of the burdens
of persuasion deserve a presumption of good faith, an elements analysis may
leave a defendant without recourse when the state has encroached on his due
process interests.U6s

In both emphasizing the importance of assessing legislative intent in determining the elements of an offense,1 64 and recognizing the authority of state
courts in interpretating state laws,165 the elements approach poses a second due
process problem. This problem occurs where a state legislature has prescribed
the elements essential to conviction, but a judicial practice allocates the

burdens of persuasion in a manner inconsistent with the legislative definition.
For example, while Pattersonseems to require consistency between the statutory
definition and the burden assigned each party, 66 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Grace v. Hopper6 7 has stated that a state court designation of es-

sential elements may supersede the legislative formula.
In Grace, a defendant who had been convicted of murder attacked the
constitutionality of a jury instruction26s requiring that he establish his insanity
defense. 69 Arguing that this practice relieved the state of the duty to prove the
161. Id.
162. Fear that unrestrained authority to define crime may adversely affect defendants has

been justified in light of several recent opinions purporting to interpret Patterson. For example, in Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 650 (D. Md. 1978), the court suggested
Patterson had held that a state legislature may have unlimited authority to "redefine its
criminal statutes in such a manner that certain aspects of proof are characterized as affirmative
defenses, the burden of proof of which is placed upon the criminal defendant." See also
Farrell v. Cyarnetzky, 566 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1268 (1978) (states
may burden defendants with proving, by a preponderance, a matter not defined by the legislature as a necessary ingredient); State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. S.Ct. 1978) (Patterson
permits state to statutorily create affirmative defenses and requires the defendant to prove them
by a preponderance of the evidence).
163. It is inappropriate, however, "to limit the scope of judidal review because of the
expectation - however reasonable - that legislative bodies will exert appropriate restraint."
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 224 n.8 (1977).
164. See notes 148-149 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 37 supra.
166. See note 175 infra.
167. 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1978).

168. While most courts have interpreted Patterson as applicable to both statutes and jury
instructions, there is some sentiment that the due process analysis outlined there should be
employed only to measure the constitutionality of statutes. See Wright v. Smith, 569 F.2d 1188,
1189 (2d Cir. 1978).
169. The instruction read: "When in a criminal trial the defendant sets up as a defense
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element of intent, the defendant pointed to the requirement of specific intent
in the statute, 7 1 to Georgia case law indicating an insane person did not
possess the requisite intent under the statute,

71

1

and to the statute's failure to

designate insanity a true affirmative defense.17 2 The court of appeals termed
the failure to label insanity an affirmative defense insignificant and found the
73
Georgia practice constitutional under Rivera and PattersonY.
Alternatively, the court suggested that even if the statute did make sanity
part of the intent element, the Georgia courts had recognized a presumption of
sanity which in effect removed sanity from the prosecution's case.17 4 This
reasoning implies the power of state courts to redefine the facts essential to
conviction. However, such judicial authority seems irreconcilable with Patterson, which interpreted the flaw in Mullaney to be the inconsistency between the
legislative definition of murder and the judicially assigned persuasion burdens,
despite state court decisions purporting to eliminate the inconsistency. Grace
indicates that an elements analysis requires only a determination of the facts
the state courts deem essential to conviction. Patterson suggests, however, that
a proper elements analysis also demands an examination of those elements the
legislature has specified as warranting imposition of the prescribed punishment.
To allow conviction on proof of less than those elements deemed essential by
the legislature would relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove all elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The implication of an elements
analysis, which terminates examination of a state court's burden of proof allocation, is less protection for the defendant's due process interests. Federal courts
would not assess whether each element of the statutory definition had been
proved, but instead would be limited to deciding whether the prosecution had
proved beyond a reasonable doubt those elements the state court deems essential under the statute.
The Two-Tiered Approach
Patterson might also be read to require a two step analysis. A court would
first determine which facts the state had labelled elements of the prosecution's
case, and which matters had been deemed affirmative defenses. This initial examination essentially involves an elements analysis. The second level of
analysis demands the determination of whether proof of the affirmative defense
requires that the defendant negate any element or definitional ingredient of

that he was insane, the burden is upon him to establish this defense, not beyond a reasonable
doubt, but to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury." 566 F.2d at 508 n.1.
170. GA. CODE ANN. §26-1101(a) (1978) (murder).
171. 566 F.2d at 510 n.3 (citing Long v. State, 38 Ga. 491 (1868)); Handspike v. State, 203
Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662 (1947).
172. 566 F.2d at 509. The defendant attempted to distinguish Rivera and Leland, claiming
that in those cases state law specifically designated insanity an affirmative defense and
burdened the defendant with the duty to persuade the factfinder. But see note 138 supra,
suggesting Leland did not involve an affirmative defense.
173. 566 F.2d at 510.
174. Id. at 510 n.6.
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the offense.1 78 A finding that the statute forces the defendant to negate either
of these would render it violative of due process as explicated in Patterson.
Such analysis, while recognizing the state's authority to define crime, nevertheless allows federal judicial intervention where a state in practice allocates
burdens inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Thus federal courts may protect the due process rights of defendants by ensuring that the state prove all
matters declared relevant to guilt by the statute, regardless of which matters
the state's courts have construed to be essential elements of the crime.
Adopting this two-tiered approach, the federal district court in Cole v.
Stevenson1 76 granted habeas corpus relief to a defendant who challenged his
second degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial court had improperly required that he prove self defense. 177 Second degree murder under
North Carolina law included the essential elements of unlawfulness and
malice.1 78 In practice, however, courts had acknowledged the existence of a
presumption of unlawfulness upon proof by the prosecution that the defendant
had intentionally inflicted a wound with a deadly weapon. 79 The Cole court
found that this presumption, coupled with the requirement that the defendant
"satisfy the jury that he had acted in self defense," effectively relieved the state
of the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the
offense, unlawfulness.81 0
The flaw inherent in North Carolina's practice was the inconsistency in
establishing an element of the offense and then requiring the defendant to
prove an affirmative defense which constituted absence of the element.181 The
175. Distinguishing the Maine statute in Mullaney, Patterson noted that the statute defined murder in terms of malice, employed a presumption of malice, and then required the
defendant to persuade the jury of the absence of malice. Although recognizing that Maine's
courts had expressly ruled that malice was not an element of the offense, the Patterson majority nevertheless found the scheme violative of due process, because "malice, in the sense
of absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that crime." 432 U.S. at 216. Thus,
Patterson may stand for the proposition that requiring the defendant to negate not only
elements, but also facts which define the offense and thus "are so important [they] must be
either proved or presumed," renders any state practice violative of due process. 432 U.S. at
215. Accord, State v. Dault, 19 Wash. App. 709, 712, 578 P.2d 43, 46 (1978).
176. 447 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
177. Defendant Cole pleaded not guilty to a murder charge, was convicted of second
degree murder by the jury, and was sentenced to 20 to 30 years imprisonment. In addition to
challenging the self-defense instruction, Cole asserted that burdening him with proof of absence
of malice similarly violated due process.
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-17 (1977). The North Carolina state courts had specified that
second degree murder consisted of the essential elements of malice and unlawfulness. See, e.g.,
State v. Drake, 8 N.C. App. 214, 219, 174 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1970).

179. See, e.g., State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333, vacated, 429 U.S. 809 (1976).
180. "By employing the presumption of unlawfulness, the state does far more than 'create
an inference that procedurally shifts the burden of going forward with proof' ...;instead, the
accused must prove by a 'preponderance' that he acted in self-defense. The state, therefore,
does not bear the burden to first prove unlawfulness but can merely rest upon the presumption." 447 F. Supp. at 1277, quoting State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 647-48, 220 S.E.2d 575,
586 (1977).
181. Other courts have subscribed to a similar analysis. In U.T. Inc. v. Brown, slip opinion
No. C-C-77-282 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 1978). the court, in examining a city ordinance noted that
although certain matters had been denominated affirmative defenses, because these particular
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Cole court thus worked no alteration of North Carolina law. Rather, the court
merely sought to protect the defendant's due process rights by insuring that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt each fact the establishment of
which, under the state formulated statutory scheme, warranted infringement
18
upon those interests. 2
A similar line of reasoning prompted a federal district court in Wallace v.
McKenzie18 3 to set aside a conviction under a West Virginia murder statute
which provided that any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing constituted murder in the first degree.18 4 West Virginia courts had created, by jury
instruction, a presumption of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had killed the decedent.'8 5
Ruling this practice constitutionally infirm in view of Mullaney and Patterson,
the Wallace court reasoned that the presumption relieved the prosecution of
the persuasion burden on issues which had been statutorily included in the
state's case,186 thereby allowing conviction without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of all facts relevant to a determination of guilt.8 7
Although Cole and Wallace suggest a greater concern for the defendant's
due process interests, 88 the analysis employed may nevertheless have an adverse
effect on those interests by discouraging legislative innovation in drafting
criminal law. If state legislators find that statutory inclusion of a new mitigating factor may render the scheme invalid because the new defense negates some
element of the offense, they may be hesitant to attempt revision. Because strict
adherence to the two-tiered analysis may forestall innovation beneficial to
criminal defendants, creation of an exception which allows allocating the
burden of persuasion to defendants on new ameliorative defenses may be
warranted. This exception would allow a slight inconsistency between an
affirmative defense and an element of the crime where the defense permits the
affirmative defenses went beyond mitigating the offense and negated an essential element, the
prosecution must bear the burden of proof.
182. The Federal District Court for the Western District of North Carolina has also considered this presumption of malice and found it violative of Mullaney and Patterson. Mills v.
Shepherd, 445 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
183. 449 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.W.Va. 1978).
184. W. VA. CODE §61-2-1 (1977).

185. 449 F. Supp. at 804.
186. Id. at 805.
187. The Wallace court went on to consider the remaining instructions given the jury, and
determined that these additional instructions were general and failed to cure the shifting of

burdens accomplished by the self defense instruction. Id. at 806-07. On several occasions courts
have found instructions accomplished an improper shifting or assignment of burdens, and yet
have failed to reverse since the overall emphasis upon the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cured the error. See Warlitner v. Weatherholtz, 447 F. Supp. 82, 87
(W.D.Va. 1977) (instruction that defendant must raise reasonable doubt as to existence of
malice violates due process, but state's burden of proving every element effectively conveyed
by overall charge).

188. Several other courts have expressed the opinion that there must be consistency between the statutorily prescribed elements and the burdens assigned the prosecution at trial.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978); Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235 (9th
Cir. 1978).
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defendant to mitigate the seriousness of his offense. 89 For example, an armed
robber in New York may reduce his punishment by showing that the firearm
used in the crime was not a loaded weapon capable of producing serious bodily
harm or death. 190 While the statute creates a presumption that the weapon can
inflict such damage,' 91 this affirmative defense, an innovation in the criminal
law beneficial to the defendant, should not be invalidated because it requires
the defendant to carry the persuasion burden.192 Because the defense has no historical significance, 19 3 no actual shifting of burdens has occurred. Because of its
benefit to the defendant, this additional burden often may be warranted.
Minimum Substantive Elements Approach
The defendant's interests of liberty and freedom from stigma receive significant protection when a court employs a two-tiered analysis, assessing both
the statutory formula and the relationship between the designated elements
and affirmative defenses. At the same time, a state's power to define criminal
behavior remains essentially free of restraint, subject only to the requirement
that the allocation of persuasion burdens be consistent with the statutory
formulation. While this arrangement may appear a fair compromise between
state and federal interests, state legislatures retain an unrestricted authority to
determine the substantive content of each crime as well as the relative burdens
imposed upon the prosecution and the defendant. Unless a federal court has
the power to measure state statutes against some minimum substantive criteria,
the authority to oversee the allocation of persuasion burdens may actually provide insignificant due process protection, because the legislature may draw a
statute narrowly to allow a finding of guilt on proof of a few basic elements.
Presumably, the Constitution limits the state's power to define crime. The
Pattersoncourt acknowledged as much' 94 but failed to provide a rational framework for determining where those limits should be drawn. gs At least one lower
federal court has attempted to fill that void, however, by suggesting that the
constitutionally required minimum elements may be established by an assess189. Perhaps the Patterson Court recognized the value of new ameliorative defenses and
therefore felt it "relevant" to note that extreme emotional disturbance was a modem version
of heat of passion. 432 U.S. at 202. The Patterson Court was at least cognizant of the arguments regarding the adverse effect on legislation favorable to the defendant, whether it intended an exception or not. Id. at 214 n.15.
190. N.Y. PENAL LAw (Consol.) §160.15 (1977).
191. Farrell v. Czametzky, 566 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978). The potential to cause physical harm is in this sense an element
of the offense, and to xequire that the defendant rebut this issue would violate Patterson.
192. Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 229 nn.14 & 15 (Powell, J., dissenting); State v.

Steward, 573 P.2d 1138 (Mont. S. Ct. 1977) (Patterson ruled that where a fact neither by
tradition nor by statute is a necessary element of the offense, a defendant may be assigned the
persuasion burden).
193. See the extensive historical section in Winship, Mullaney and Patterson, where
the Court assessed the traditional importance of each defense involved. See notes 28, 72 &
73 supra and accompanying text.
194. 432 US. at 210. See note 164 supra.
195. The lone limitation which the Patterson Court specified was that an intent element
must be proved. See the Court's discussion of Leland and Rivera at 432 U.S. at 206.
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ment of the nature of the offense charged and its relation to the defense asserted.
In Rodgers v. Redman,196 the defendant was convicted of robbery, attempted rape, and assault. 197 On appeal, he alleged that a jury instruction imposing upon him the burden of proving his defense of alibi by a preponderance
of evidence violated due process of law. Acknowledging that Patterson and its
predecessors imposed upon the prosecution the burden of proving each essential
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the Rodgers court analyzed
the nature of each of the crimes charged. The court suggested that commission
of each crime necessarily required the defendant's presence, and therefore that
presence constituted an essential element. Because alibi denies presence, the
court reasoned, burdening the defendant with proof of alibi would be fundamentally inconsistent with the reasonable doubt standard espoused in Winship
19
and would thus be constitutionally impermissible. 8
The substantive analysis employed in Rodgers offers the greatest protection
for the defendant's due process interests of any of the three suggested interpretations of Patterson.A federal court utilizing the method of analysis suggested
in Rodgers would not be limited to assessing whether the state had allocated
the persuasion burden consistent with the legislatively or judicially prescribed
elements. Rather, the federal court could legitimately determine whether the
state had met due process requirements in drafting criminal statutes. 99
CONCLUSION

Pattersonv. New York was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve
196.

Slip opinion no. 78-69 (D. Del. Sept. 1978).

197. Id.
198.

Id. at 932. While the court did not dispute the state's authority to burden the de-

fendant with proof of an affirmative defense, it did suggest that the power to designate a fact
as an affirmative defense was controlled by the nature of that fact in relation to the crime.
Only matters which justify or excuse the admitted act could be deemed affirmative defenses.

A defense which denies the existence of an element of the crime may not be designated affirmative.
199. This substantive analysis has been favorably referred to by several other courts. See
Porter v. Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 253 (D.S.C. 1978) (self-defense may negate unlawfulness); Reeves
v. Reed, 452 F. Supp. 783 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (unlawfulness an element of voluntary manslaughter so instruction on implied unlawfulness violates due process); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d
140 (Me. 1977) (intoxication negates intent of any kind so state must prove absence of involuntary intoxication).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also employed a method of analysis seemingly
in line with the substantive approach in assessing the allocation of the burdens of persuasion.

In United States v. Jackson, No. 78-5043 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 1978), defendant had been convicted of assaulting federal officers while engaged in their official duties, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §111 (1970). At trial, the federal district court instructed the jury that the defendant
had the burden of proof on his affirmative defense of temporary insanity. In reversing on the
grounds that the instruction constituted plain error, the court of appeals commented that

because the defense of temporary insanity negates criminal intent, which is an essential element of the crime, the burden of proof is necessarily on the prosecution. Id. Since intent did
not constitute a statutory element, the court has in effect held that the state's burden of

proof extends beyond those definitional elements to substantive elements which, though unspecified by statute, are essential to the crime.
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the uncertainty generated by the Mullaney decision's extension of Winship's
reasonable doubt standard to matters collateral to the guilt determination in
criminal actions. Rather than enunciate a clear rule for applying the reasonable
doubt standard, however, the Court attempted to distinguish Mullaney by contrasting Maine's utilization of a presumption to allocate a persuasion burden to
the defendant with New York's allocation of the same burden by employing an
affirmative defense. Unfortunately, justifying the assignment of burdens to the
defendant on the basis of the form employed by the statutory scheme provides
no useful guidance in properly balancing the federal interest in protecting the
defendant's due process rights with the state's interest in defining and controlling criminal behavior. Thus, Patterson leaves the tension between these
interests unresolved and forces lower courts to determine on a case-by-case basis
the weight to be accorded to each.
The danger inherent in a case-by-case analysis of federal and state interests
lies in the possibility that as lower courts struggle to interpret Patterson's
mandate, the criminal defendant's fundamental right to have guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt may be compromised. A lower court opting for an
elements test will examine the statute only to determine which facts the state
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This interpretation of Pattersonfavors exclusively the state's interest in defining criminal behavior. In contrast, although interpreting Pattersonto require an assessment of
the minimum substantive elements emphasizes the federal interest in protecting
the defendant's due process rights, such an interpretation may result in excessive federal intrusion into state lawmaking. Consequently, it seems likely
that most courts will adhere to a compromise, the two-tiered approach, thereby
reading Pattersonto prescribe an analysis of how the state statute allocates the
persuasion burdens, and of whether state courts assign those burdens in a
manner consistent with the statute.
TIMON V. SULLIVAN
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